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Pragmatism, Transcendentalism,
and Perfectionism
Introduction to the Symposia
Piergiorgio Donatelli, Roberto Frega and Sandra Laugier
1 The  relation  between  Pragmatism,  Transcendentalism,  and  Perfectionism  is  both
obvious and difficult,  and this is what prompted us to edit the present issue of the
Journal. The relation is obvious, because the history of American Philosophy is deeply
textured by this relation, and the transition from Transcendentalism to Pragmatism
has  been historically  attested.  Difficult,  because  these  traditions  seem to  deny  one
another.1 Pragmatist philosophers have often presented themselves as the founders of
the American philosophical tradition, or at least of a new one; and in order to establish
their  philosophical  and  epistemological legitimacy,  they  have  undervalued  the
influence  of  previous  tradition.  While  this  is  mostly  evident  in  the  case  of  Ralph
Emerson,  similar  remarks  can  be  made  for  the  whole  American  pre-pragmatist
philosophical tradition. On the other hand, lovers of Transcendentalism (Stanley Cavell
being  the  first)  have  vindicated  Emerson’s  voice  by  disconnecting  him  from
Pragmatism  and  claiming  his  irreducibility  to  the  pragmatist  tradition.  There  has
therefore been a sort of Transcendental anti-pragmatist reaction, issuing in charges to
the  effect  that  Pragmatists  have  been  blind,  or  deaf,  to  Emerson’s  influence  and,
consequently,  to  perfectionist  themes.2 This  question,  then,  seems  to  need  some
elucidation, and, moreover, seems to be at the core of any reflection on the nature and
definition of American Philosophy today.
2 The recent upsurge of studies aimed at exploring the historical relationships between
these traditions has not  obfuscated the importance of  Cavell’s  voice in this  debate.
Indeed,  his  work  has  significantly  contributed  to  the  emergence  of  a  specifically
perfectionist  dimension  to  this  discussion,  making  a  distinct  contribution  to  the
fashioning of the very idea of American Philosophy as a Philosophy Americana.3 Cavell, in
works  such  as  Conditions  Handsome  and  Unhandsome:  The  Constitution  of  Emersonian
Perfectionism (1990) and Cities of Words (2004), has worked to bring Emerson’s voice back
to the heart of American philosophy. Beyond mere historical rehabilitation, Cavell has
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sought to establish the present-day relevance of Emerson’s thinking. He identifies the
task  of  establishing  Emerson  as  an  actual  philosopher  with  a  twofold  struggle:
distinguishing  Emerson  from  the  Pragmatists  and  distinguishing  himself  from
“neopragmatists,” i.e., those who, like Rorty, claim the inheritance of Dewey. Thus, the
struggle  for  a  new  appraisal  of  Transcendentalist  themes  has  turned  out  to  be  a
struggle for inheritances.
3 As Cavell  notes  in  This  New Yet  Unapproachable  America  (1989),  in  order  to  establish
something as American philosophy, you need to specify whom you will inherit from.
The  classical  European  tradition  imported  during colonial  period?  The  native,
indigenous  traditions  existing  since  time  immemorial?  From  Emerson  and  the
Transcendentalists? From Dewey, James, Peirce and the other Pragmatists? Or from the
philosophers  of  the  Vienna  circle,  who  arrived  during  the  1930’s  and  40’s?  These
struggles over inheritance are not merely historical quarrels:  they play an essential
role in establishing what the word “American” might mean for philosophy in America
today.  They  are  thus  at  the  very  heart  of  the  making  of  contemporary  American
philosophy.  In  this  sense,  Cavell’s  reappropriation  of  the  Emersonian  tradition
represents  but  a  step  in  the  broader  process  through  which  American  philosophy
attempts  the  reappraisal  of  its  own  sources.  It  parallels  Rorty’s  re-discovery  of
Pragmatism  at  a  time  when  Pragmatism  was  itself  deeply  marginalized  within
American philosophy,4 and it has been followed by a more recent but equally important
reappraisal of those native and indigenous philosophical sources that shaped American
culture (and therefore philosophy) prior to and independently of both Pragmatism and
Transcendentalism.5 All  these  different  philosophical  strands  are  contributing  to  a
significant transformation of American philosophy: if we compare what is being done
in philosophy in America today to what constituted the bulk of American philosophy
only three decades ago,  one is  simply astonished by the incredibly rich and varied
spread  of  approaches  and traditions  that  have  come to  compose  it.  The  state  of  a
dominantly analytical and post-positivist philosophy (later to be opposed to a post-
modern philosophy hosted  by  literature  departments)  has  now been replaced  by  a
much more pluralistic  and sometimes even syncretistic  flourishing of  philosophical
traditions.  Cavell  is  probably  the  most  prominent  among  a  plurality  of  voices  in
insisting that the recovery of the American tradition in philosophy should not be veiled
by a generalized appeal to pragmatism and that, accordingly, there is really no point in
calling  “Pragmatist”  anything  that  has  been  done  in  philosophy  before  the  rise  of
analytical  philosophy.  Cavell’s  point  is  that  we should  give  room to  a  wider,  more
inclusive understanding of the American inheritance, an inheritance that is at the same
time pragmatist,  pre-pragmatist,  and non-pragmatist.  This is  the historical  scenario
within which Cavell’s reappraisal of Emerson and, more generally, the renaissance of
an Emersonian tradition today has to be understood.
4 In the context of this framework, Cavell has given himself the task – notably in his
essays “What is the Emersonian Event?,” and “What’s the Use of Calling Emerson a
Pragmatist?”  –  of  clearly  distinguishing  Emerson from Pragmatism.  His  strategy  of
demarcation  is  based  upon  a  reading  of  Pragmatism  –  and  notably  of  Deweyan
Pragmatism  –  stressing  those  elements  of  instrumentalism  and  practicalism  (what
Dewey called ironically a “bread and butter” kind of Pragmatism) that mostly contrast
with the ethical insights of the Transcendental tradition. Such a position has appeared
to many to be quite unfair. One has to consider, for instance, Dewey’s many references
to Emerson (see Colapietro 2004, Saito 2005, and Juan Pablo Serra this issue) as well as
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Dewey’s reflective and imaginative conception of ethical experience (see Frega 2006,
Pappas 2008).
5 Given his views about the philosophical importance of the theme of inheritance, this
demarcation has had a central methodological importance to Cavell. But it has also a
philosophical significance of its own. Pragmatism and Perfectionism, in fact, incarnate
a tension between two dimensions of moral experience whose reconciliation remains
an unachieved task for moral and political thinking. On the one hand, you have the
pragmatist  struggle  to  account  for  human  experience  within  the  framework  of  a
rationality  immanent  to  experience  and  focused  on  the  needs  that  emerge  within
contextual problematic situations. On the other, the perfectionist idea that at the heart
of  experience  lies  a  core  which  is  and  remains  irreducible  to  any  effort  at
rationalization,  and  which  escapes  any  reductivist  attempt  at  accounting  for  it  in
functional,  instrumental  or  materialist  terms.  This  tension  notwithstanding,
pragmatism and perfectionism are philosophical traditions that share quite a broad
basis  provided  by  the  primacy  both  assign  to  the ordinary  as  well  as  the
epistemological  primacy they assign to  experience as  a  privileged starting point  in
philosophy. Yet they part ways, at least partially, with respect to the part of experience
they  decide  to  emphasize:  its  reflective  and  rational  character  in  pragmatism;  its
stubborn  irreducibility  to  a  complete  and  self-transparent  articulation  in
perfectionism.
6 Accordingly, for Cavell the reappropriation of Emerson’s true voice – the specific tone of
Emerson – requires in the first instance a differentiation from Pragmatism. As Cavell
says  early  on  (this  time  regarding  the  difference  between  Pragmatism  and
Wittgenstein):
It might be worth pointing out that these teachings are fundamental to American
pragmatism; but then we must keep in mind how different their arguments sound,
and admit that in philosophy it is the sound that makes all the difference. (Cavell
1969: 36; 2003: 216)
7 This tone in Emerson (that Cavell in a previous text called “mood” and, later, “pitch”),
or Wittgenstein for that matter, is not a variable or psychological element: it is our
capacity  to  speak,  to  stand  up  and  speak  for  ourselves  or  for  others,  to  take  into
account the fact that language is said and must be said in order to really be meant
(herein lies the meaning of the title of his first text “Must We Mean What We Say?”).
Here  we  should  certainly  remark  that  a  certain  priority  of  language  which  marks
Cavell’s  approach  to  philosophy  is  not  to  be  found in  classical  pragmatism,  whose
philosophical stance is rather marked by the priority of experience over language.
8 This  different  attitude  accounts  for  some  of  the  distance  that  characterizes  the
relationship between pragmatism and perfectionism, or transcendentalism, although
such differences should not be overemphasized. At any rate, one should distinguish the
disagreement  marking  Cavell’s  distance  from  classical pragmatism  from  the
disagreement between Cavell and the neo-pragmatists. It is at this second level that the
question of inheritance emerges, so that we might describe the disagreement between
Rorty  and  Cavell  as  a  disagreement  over  inheritance:  it  concerns  the  figures  of
American philosophy each of them promotes. Of course, Cavell, Putnam, and Rorty join
forces in wishing to prompt the rediscovery of unjustly neglected American thinkers
(Emerson, James, Dewey). Yet the forms and the meaning of this rediscovery are not
the same. Although in keeping with a felicitous movement of reappropriation of the
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American  philosophical  past,  the  rediscovery  of  Pragmatism  is  feared  by  Cavell  to
circumvent Emerson’s originality. For Cavell, reading Emerson means rediscovering his
specificity, a certain approach to the ordinary and to democracy, which is insoluble in
terms of the consensual thinking on democracy that developed in America during the
20th century.
9 According  to  Cavell,  in  order  to  realize  this,  it  is  necessary  to  listen  to  the
distinctiveness of Emerson’s voice, the difference in tone in the treatment he proposes
of themes now familiar in the writing of John Dewey. In “What’s the Use of Calling
Emerson  a  Pragmatist?”  Cavell  distinguishes  Emerson  from  Dewey  and  from
Pragmatism in general by the tone of his democratic aspiration (Cavell 2003: 216). The
question is therefore to decide which Emerson we wish to inherit today: the precursor
of Pragmatism, who would poetically formulate some principles later to be rationalized
(as the call to commonality and practicality), or the radical thinker of individualism?
Cavell wants to establish a caesura between Transcendentalism and Pragmatism. As a
consequence of this, Cavell’s position towards Pragmatism appears inevitably unjust,
notably towards sincere defenders of democracy like Dewey, or towards philosophers
like  William  James  who  claimed  (certainly  not  without  ambiguity)  a  part  of  the
Emersonian legacy.
10 In any case, it is precisely in the democratic demand, however, that Cavell proposes to
locate what is different in Emerson, even if we find more than an echo of Emerson in
Dewey, who never ceased to refer to his debt to Emerson (Dewey 1903). Dewey, like
Emerson, demanded commonality, that the ordinary or everyday life be shared by all
men;  and  both  called  for  an  ideal  community.  But  in  the  Emersonian  approach to
commonality, there is nothing of a consensus or a rational agreement. Cavell urges this
point also against contemporary political theories of democracy, most notably against
the  Rawlsian  conception  and  the  long  lasting  tradition  of  contractualism.  A
characteristic of Emerson’s politics is his critical dimension, a perfectionist refusal of
society such as it exists – a refusal to recognize it as belonging to oneself as soon as one
begins searching for a better self. Hence the notes of hatred for his contemporaries that
sometimes sound in his work, which are justified only by a hatred for oneself:
Emersonian Perfectionism requires that we become ashamed in a particular way of
ourselves,  of  our  present  stance,  and  the  Emersonian  Nietzsche  requires,  as  a
consecration  of  the  next  self,  that  we  hate  ourselves,  as  it  were  impersonally.
(Cavell 1990: 16)
11 A  political  implication  of  this  skeptical  refusal  to  accept  to  resolve  agreement  in
consensus  is  an  original  questioning  of  the  relationship  of  the  individual  to  the
community. This is what Cavell thinks is lost in Pragmatism – but more generally in
mainstream con- temporary political theory – and why, according to Cavell, Emerson’s
voice  is  “deadened”  even  in  19th  century  American  Philosophy.  Still,  the  question
remains open: maybe because Cavell’s position, as shown in a number of contributions
here  (Ardiv,  Dika),  is  deeply  determined  by  the  connection  between  Emerson  and
Wittgenstein established, e.g., in Cavell (1989), and their approach to voice. The voice is
precisely what is defined, at the start of “Self-Reliance,” as the very demand to trust
oneself, which Cavell calls the “arrogation of voice” that leads oneself to say “We,” to
speak in the name of the rest of humanity. For Cavell, the first question, then, is indeed
knowing how one can speak – who, apart from me could give me the authority to speak
for us? This is the question he had already asked in “Must We Mean What We Say?”
where he examined the method of ordinary language philosophy, which consists in
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elucidating what we say, and which led him in turn to Austin’s defense. This question of
the voice comes years before Cavell’s discovery of it in Emerson, with its themes of the
acceptance  of  speech,  of  the  autobiographical,  and  the  act  of  (dis)possessing  one’s
speech  as  the  only  manner,  paradoxically,  of  accessing  representativeness.  Cavell
generalizes the autobiographical  dimension of any speech act in the first  person in
clearly Emersonian terms:
The  autobiographical  dimension  of  philosophy  is  internal  to  the  claim  that
philosophy  speak  for  the  human,  for  all;  that  is  its  necessary  arrogance.  The
philosophical dimension of autobiography is that the human is representative, say,
imitative, that each life is exemplary of all, a parable of each; that is humanity’s
commonness, which is internal to its endless denials of commonness. (Cavell 2003:
10-1)
12 The enigma of  representativeness is  then the central  enigma of  politics.  How can I
relinquish my voice and consider that someone represent and speak for me? Here, the
connection to Dewey’s themes becomes obvious, especially if one relies on Emerson and
Cavell’s  call  for  a  community  and  Dewey’s  call  for  a  public  as  the  necessary  and
necessarily unachieved task of democracy. Cavell’s discovery of Emerson, which took
place some years after the publication of The Claim of  Reason,  responds to problems
raised very early in his philosophy. Recall  that Cavell  remarks,  in his first  texts on
Emerson, that he was for a long time deaf and indifferent towards Emerson. One is thus
only struck all the more by the Emersonian tone of these passages from The Claim of
Reason:
But  since  the  genuine  social  contract  is  not  in  effect  (we  could  know  this  by
knowing that we are born free, and are everywhere in chains) it follows that we are
not exercising our general will; and since we are not in a state of nature it follows
that we are exercising our will  not to the general,  but to the particular,  to the
unequal, to private benefit to privacy. We obey the logic of conspiracy. (Cavell 1979:
26)
13 The question  of  the  voice  is  thus  the  political  question,  from Plato  to  Rousseau  to
Emerson and Dewey. Cavell, when he takes it upon himself to bring Emerson’s voice
back to the field of philosophy, inscribes Wittgenstein himself in the extension of the
Emersonian voice.
To speak for oneself politically is to speak for the others with whom you consent to
association, and it is to consent to be spoken for by them – not as a parent speaks
for you, i.e. instead of you, but as someone in mutuality speaks for you, i.e. speaks
your mind. Who these others are, for whom you speak and by whom you are spoken
for, is not known a priori, though it is in practice generally treated as given. (Cavell
1979: 27)
14 Democracy,  for  Emerson,  is  inseparable  from  Self-Reliance,  that  is  to  say,  from
confidence – not as hollow self-conceit or a feeling of superiority (a debased version of
perfectionism, as he sometimes says), but as a refusal of conformity, of letting oneself be
spoken for by others. Self-reliance is thus a political position, claiming the voice of the
subject from conformism, from uses that are accepted in a non-critical way, and from
dead institutions, or those no longer representative or “confiscated.” Cavell therefore
brings  perfectionism back to  contemporary politics  at  a  time when Rawls’  political
liberalism  seemed  to  have  definitively  expunged  it  from  political  theory.  Rorty’s
proposition, which sees in Emerson the precursor of a pragmatism whose tradition,
with  liberalism,  continues  on  into  the  20th  century,  rests,  for  Cavell,  on  a  lack  of
understanding  Emerson’s  political  specificity.  This  is  the  critical  requirement  with
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Emerson: a critique, first of all, of oneself, one that inscribes itself at the heart of the
contemporary  American  debate  on  political  radicalism  and  its  legacy,  a  political
question of  individualism as  a  principle  of  the  agreement  to  society  (see  Bercovitch
1993).  But  self-reliance  only  has  strength  or  practical  value  if  its  aversion  to
conformism also addresses itself to oneself:
So we are to remember that an aversive address may be taken toward oneself as
much  as  toward  any  institution.  Not  thus  to  address  the  self  is  to  harbor
conformity, and I think Emerson invites us to see this as a political choice. (Cavell
2003: 190)
15 Cavell compares Dewey’s treatment of intelligence6 with what Emerson wrote in “Self-
Reliance”: “To believe your own thought […] that is genius.” When Emerson evokes the
genius in each person, he expresses the hope that man is one, and that he can therefore
become ordinary, attain his ordinariness, and such a hope has nothing to do with the
increase of knowledge or scientific progress. In attaining the ordinary and democracy
by way of individual genius instead of by science and the reform of intelligence: there
again is something that separates Transcendentalism from Pragmatism.
16 We  could  also  characterize  this  difference  by  turning  to  science,  which  rendered
Pragmatism  more  presentable  in  the  20th  century,  and  thus  more  assimilable  to
analytical  philosophy than Transcendentalism.  Cavell  thinks  that  there  is  a  certain
conflict between the appeal to science and the appeal to ordinary language, which has
been  constant  since  the  entrance  of  the  latter  into  philosophy.  It  is  the  specific
difficulty in turning to ordinary language, and more generally in rediscovering what is
common  to  us,  that  is  forgotten  in  Pragmatism.  We  could  then  characterize  the
difference between Transcendentalism and Pragmatism as the difference between the
appeal to the ordinary and the appeal to commonality – except that commonality, in
Pragmatism,  appears  as  given,  while  for  Transcendentalism,  it  is  an  object  of
skepticism:
The philosophical appeal to the ordinary, the words we are given in common, is
inherently taken in opposition to something about my words as they stand. […] The
appeal challenges our commonality in favor of a more genuine commonality (surely
something that characterizes Dewey’s philosophical mission) but in the name of no
expertise, no standing adherence to logic or to science, to nothing beyond genius.
(Cavell 2003: 218)
17 It is for this reason that the symptom of Pragmatism’s ignorance of the ordinary is, for
Cavell,  its  casualness  regarding  Skepticism,  or  the  idea  that  science  constitutes  a
response to Skepticism. Emerson’s entire work is run through, at least after Nature,
with  the  menace  of  Skepticism.  According  to  Cavell,  the  refusal  of  Skepticism  is,
conversely, a characteristic of Pragmatism:
In  contrast,  neither  James  nor  Dewey  seems  to  take  the  threat  of  skepticism
seriously. […] Pragmatism seems designed to refuse to take skepticism seriously, as
it  refuses  –  in  Dewey’s,  if  not  always  in  James’  case  –  to  take  metaphysical
distinctions seriously. (Cavell 2003: 221)
18 Here we see probably the highest point of Cavell’s misunderstanding of pragmatism: he
draws an opposition between science and the ordinary (that according to him is an
opposition between science and ordinary language) where the real opposition is that
taking place between a philosophy of the ordinary as experience and a philosophy of the
ordinary as language. Here lies one of the enduring sources of the misunderstanding of
pragmatism: its call for intelligence, for practice, for the public nature of thought are
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but appeals to the manifold and constantly changing guises of human experience. In its
closeness to experience, pragmatism and perfectionism are probably closer than they
are  currently  acknowledged  to  be.7 And  yet,  as  Cavell  incessantly  remarks,  our
philosophical understanding should be sensitive to their irreducible differences, which
should neither be neglected nor conceived as forms of conflict. They are, rather, as
Cavell aptly acknowledges, forms of philosophical tension.8
19 This  perspective  makes  it  easier  to  rethink –  under  the  guise  of  this  philosophical
tension – Dewey’s political and ethical ideas in relation to those expressed by Emerson.
We all know that the democratic influence of the philosophical appeal to the ordinary
is an essential question for Emerson and Dewey. Emerson and Dewey are both, although
in  dissimilar  ways,  thinkers  of  the  community.  They  both  praise  the  communal
dimension of human experience, and they both call for an ethical engagement as the
necessary basis of political democracy. Yet Emerson, more than Dewey, has stressed the
irreducibility  of  the  individual  to  the  community,  the  political  necessity  of  taking
seriously his individual voice the moment before it vanishes into the universal vacuum
of political consensus. While Dewey’s democracy at times seems to take the individual’s
assent  to  the  community  too  easily  for  granted,  Emerson  reminds  us  that  human
association is always on the verge of failure. Both the Emersonian and the Pragmatist
tradition bring to contemporary thought voices that cannot easily be reconciled with
the mainstream categories of moral and political philosophy. They are both accused to
be the bearers of a currently unacceptable perfectionism and, although for different
reasons, to foster oppressive political conceptions. Yet their perfectionism is not the
same, and their conceptions of the individual and of the community differ at significant
points. These are some of the moments of this fruitful tension that constantly unites
and separates the pragmatist and the perfectionist traditions in philosophy.
20 It  is  with  the  aim of  furthering  the  complex  and  rich  conversation  between these
American traditions that many of the essays here published propose a reworking of
moral perfectionism as this notion has been invented by Cavell in his specific reading of
Emerson. Cavell brings his long reflection in several fields of philosophy and cultural
criticism – more directly in the direction of rethinking the place and the nature of
ethics – and in so doing he opens a new scene in moral and political philosophy. In
Cavell’s treatment, moral perfectionism is an elaboration of the importance of the idea
that one’s life is progressing towards an ideal of perfectibility, but he actually moves
this  notion into an  entirely  new  space  where  new  questions  are  seen  and  a  new
problematic is introduced. The idea of perfectibility and thus of a movement from the
present condition to a further, better one is placed within the circumstances of a self
which may find or lose herself, may find or lose confidence in herself, in her grasp of
the world  and of  people.  Cavell’s  diagnosis  is  that  the place  of  such movements  is
mainly  missed  by  philosophical  ethics  nowadays,  and  the  notion  of  perfectionism
attempts to render this area of life visible once again. The dimension of perfectionism
renders  visible  such  movements  of  the  self  that  make  sense  as  discoveries  of
possibilities which require a distance from one’s present condition, and yet which are
also  perceived  as  a  further  stage  of  one’s  life  (see  Sophie  Djigo  on  this  notion  of
possibility).
21 The condition of the self diagnosed by Cavell’s perfectionism speaks to issues of moral
education,  the  importance  of  the  philosophic  notion  of  virtue,  the  importance  of
sentiments and motivation, and against a picture which attributes the main role to
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reasons which move in an empty space (emptied of humanity). But it does so in a way
which places  the idea of  becoming intelligible  to  oneself  at  the center,  the idea of
authenticity, self-discovery, self-reliance, and thus introduces the notion of the self as
something that needs to be conquered against the inclination to take it for granted as a
matter  of  habit,  of  what  is  received  passively  from  society,  or  of  what  is  merely
absorbed but never made one’s own. At this crossroad we find issues of how one comes
to terms with one’s culture, of the various possibilities of inheritance, transformation
or refusal (see Martin Shuster). In this perspective perfectionism rethinks what makes
one’s  relationship with other people,  with society and with one’s  beliefs  something
alive and meaningful, or on the contrary something disconnected from ourselves: the
conditions  of  friendship  (see  Russell  Goodman  on  this  crucial  notion)  and  of  just
institutions (on Rawls and Cavell, see Nadav Arviv).
22 The way in which Cavell inscribes into the notion of the self and its education this
radical  possibility  of  loss  shapes  moral  perfectionism and its  dialogue with various
traditions  that  have  placed  the  importance  of  self  transformation  and  the test  of
personal  life  at  the  center  of  their  reflections.  Perfectionism encourages  especially
dialogue with the ancient tradition (see Daniele Lorenzini on a comparison between the
ancient and the modern), with the Socratic notion of ethics as a kind of integrity with
oneself, with the special place given by Aristotle to the virtue of friendship, with the
Hellenistic teachings about how to take care of oneself in a way which transforms the
substance of one’s self (as first given prominence by Foucault), and also with how this
rich tradition gets to be re-employed by Christianity. This dialogue continues through
the centuries with the difficulties and resistances offered – if  we follow once again
Foucault’s  lesson  –  by  both  Christianity’s  interest  in  making  self-transformation
invisible as a possibility open to all and by the detachment of spirituality from science,
which in  the  end means the  neglect  of  spirituality  as  an area in  which knowledge
requires personal transformation. A space for moral perfectionism comes to be visible
from within the preoccupations of the authors whom Cavell takes as main references:
Emerson, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, among others (see Russell Goodman, Joseph Urbas
and Heikki Kovalainen on Emerson, Tarek Dika on Wittgenstein). Our main focus is of
course the connection between transcendentalism and pragmatism: some of the papers
show Emerson’s influence on Dewey and James, and thereby go up against a tendency,
in the promoters of American transcendentalism, to deny the very important influence
of Emersonian ethics on Pragmatist ethics, which elaborates the perfectionist role of
the self and of its relation to democratic society (see Sarin Marchetti on William James,
Juan Pablo Serra on Peirce and Dewey). Cavell writes that his way of introducing moral
perfectionism suggests that it should not be thought of “as a competing moral theory
[…] but as emphasizing a dimension of the moral life any theory of it  may wish to
accommodate” (Cavell 1990:  xxxi). We may actually enlarge the comparison with the
various traditional ways in which philosophic ethics is treated in the analytic language
– metaethics, moral theory, applied ethics – and explore how they miss this dimension.
23 The emphasis  placed by  perfectionism on the  self  may also  be  read along with  its
emphasis on the voice with which we speak, on the words that make us intelligible to
ourselves, on how we take in the things that happen, on what sorts of attention and
senses  of  portance  make  these  things  our  personal  and  shared  world.  Here
perfectionism  shows  how  traditional  divisions  within  metaethics  about  the  role  of
language and its connection with reason and the sentiments may leave this dimension
of the moral  life  entirely out  of  consideration (see Jeremy Millington).  The kind of
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personal weight borne by a word, which is also the weight of a whole culture, what
makes a fact significant and important,  may not be registered along the traditional
lines of cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The traditional concern within metaethics for
language has missed the importance for words as being expressive of one’s life, of one’s
attachment or separation from others and from the world. This was the topic of Iris
Murdoch’s writings from the 50s on, and such issues have been taken over and explored
beautifully  by  Cora  Diamond  (see  Stefano  Di  Brisco  on  this).  This  also  shows  how
perfectionism requires an understanding of the imaginative arts, of literature and film,
as places where the expressive character of  words and human voice are dealt  with
crucially.
24 Another theme explored by Perfectionism (and on a different tone by pragmatism too)
is that of the place of reasons and rationality within moral life. Perfectionist thinkers –
Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond above all – have claimed that the choice offered by
moral  theory,  especially  through  the  false  alternative  between  utilitarian  and
deontological ethics, presents moral experience in a rationalized form which does not
answer the questions raised by moral perfectionism (on perfectionism and reasoning,
see Matteo Falomi). The approaches which place virtue at the center may also miss the
concern of perfectionism for the transformation of the self as a matter of self-discovery
and intelligibility. Further, what is now discussed as applied ethics may also easily miss
the concern that perfectionism elaborates for the richness of the concrete case. Applied
ethics  has  been  thought  of,  in  the  course  of  its  main  discussions,  as  conceptual
clarification which bears on general notions and large theories, whereas perfectionism
suggests bringing in reflection and generality in a different manner, that is, in the way
in which a specific circumstance facing specific people can call a whole culture and way
of thinking into question, and how one personally takes responsibility for this.
25 These are but some of the challenges that the articles published in this volume take on.
They show to a considerable degree that Transcendentalism and Perfectionism belong
to  the  best  part  of  the  American tradition in  philosophy.  They  also  show that  the
dialogue with the Pragmatist  tradition is  fruitful  and worth pursuing as  a  dialogue
among members of a common philosophical family.
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NOTES
1. There are, though, some considerable exceptions. See notably Goodman 1990, and Anderson
2006.
2. We  owe  to  Naoko  Saito  a  careful  reconstruction  of  the  philosophical  kernel  uniting  and
dividing  Emerson,  Dewey,  and  Cavell  on  the  question  of  the  philosophical  inheritance  of
transcendentalist  themes within pragmatism, and of pragmatist themes within contemporary
perfectionist thought. See Saito 2005.
3. See Anderson 2006 for a philosophical interpretation of this notion.
4. See his important Presidential Address of the APA in 1978 (Rorty 1980), echoed some years
later by that of Richard Bernstein, significantly devoted to a reconciliation in the appraisal of the
common roots of the American philosophical tradition (Bernstein 1988).
5. See the reconstruction of this historical process offered by Scott Pratt 2002. See also Bunge
1984, Dunsmore 1997, and Wilshire 2000.
6. [Pragmatism] is the formation of a faith in intelligence, as the one and indispensable belief
necessary  to  moral  and  social  life”  (Dewey  1963:  34-5).  The  quotation  is  taken  from  “The
Development of American Pragmatism.”
7. But see Saito’s important achievement in bringing Pragmatism and Perfectionism closer.
8. See Cavell’s Foreword to Saito 2005.
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